It is both a common and
common sense understanding that the United States no longer exercises
dominant influence over the global economy. While still the world's
largest economy, (twice the size of China's and almost equal to the
combined 27 nation European Union), and possessor of the dominant
international reserve currency, economic globalization, including
dependence on relatively few sources of oil have greatly diminished
U.S. influence. A similar trend, especially pronounced since the end
of the Cold War in late 1991, in the diplomatic and international
security areas has led to prominent failures and inaction with only a
few examples of successful U.S. led international cooperation. The
first Gulf War in 1991 and the air campaign and eventual settlement
of the Bosnian conflict in 1995 are the most prominent.
U.S. foreign policy makers
are faced with choices, not certainties. The context for these
choices are first, a Kissinger style “Realpolitik” of dealing
with the world as we find it and not as we would prefer it. The
alternative context is constructing foreign and security policies
based not on capabilities and interests but on concepts of
international or national moral obligations. The latter was a
significant ingredient in the 2003 invasion of Iraq and the failed
nine and ten year efforts to democratize and “nation build” in
both Iraq and Afghanistan.
Now with major cuts in
military spending, combined with the aforementioned diminished
economic influence in the world, policy makers should make decisions
based on what we can do, what the costs will be and what the long
term ramifications will be. In the current international environment
one thing that we can't do is defeat the Afghan Taliban, impose
democratic institutions and processes and successfully “build” a
democratic nation. The physical environment and the rules of
engagement imposed on the military by the nation builders futile
attempts to win the “hearts and minds” of the Afghan populace
have resulted in a ten year stalemate. Afghanistan's, primitive,
tribal society simply does not possess the raw material for an
understanding, appreciation for, or tolerance of democratic
principles. The current paroxysms of hate and violence over the
accidental burning of a few Islamic holy books is illustrative and
simply doesn't conform to basic rules of democratic governance. And
this incident is just a small example of the ignorance, intolerance
and fanaticism dominant in the society.
Tribal and sectarian
identification vs. any overarching loyalty to the nation, have
resulted in the failure of similar nation building attempts in Iraq.
Since the U.S. withdrawal, daily bombings by Sunni militants on
Shiite mosques, neighborhoods and the institutions of the Shiite
dominated government portend a violent, long term struggle with
considerable outside interference by regional states.
The U.S. cannot bring about
stable, democratic regimes in Egypt or Libya. The Obama
Administration's late support of the popular uprising against Egypt's
Mubarak government and its naïve offer of $1.5 billion before even
knowing who the recipients would be or how the money would be spent,
accomplished nothing. The Egyptian political situation remains
chaotic with the outcome being a possible anti-Western Islamic state
or a return to direct or indirect military rule.
The situation in Libya,
although influenced by U.S. support for the British and French led
air campaign that helped overthrow the Qaddafi regime, is similarly
beyond meaningful influence by Western governments including the
U.S., who can do nothing but standby while the proliferation of
tribal militias battle among themselves for power.
Islamic militants and
terrorists in Nigeria, an important oil exporting nation, and Somalia
have attracted U.S. attention, and in Somalia the U.S. conducts
desultory drone and special operations missions. But these are small
operations in what is still a peripheral, though potentially
important area and a failed state. There is simply no prospect for a
wider U.S. involvement or definable success in these efforts.
But it is the situation in
Syria which makes the inability of the U.S. to dictate outcomes in
important geopolitical conflicts most apparent. Secretary of State
Clinton's frequent and meaningless “condemnations” of violence
and calls for President Bashar Assad to step down, simply emphasize
the lack of U.S. influence. The choices available to outside
interests, be they humanitarian or security interests, are limited
and contain potential contradictions.
Syria is not Libya. Assad
commands a large, Russian equipped military with an officer corps
made up from his ruling Alawite sect. The publicly stated goals of
the regional and international community are first to end the
slaughter of the Syrian citizenry, from whom the insurgency is drawn
but which include many innocent non-participants. Second, there is
general unanimity, with the exceptions of Iran, Russia and China, for
regime change.
The suggestions for how to
bring this about are divided. One group, which includes several of
the Sunni Arab members of the Arab League, wants to provide arms to
the insurgency to both defend themselves and enhance their prospects
for demoralizing the Syrian military and bringing about the downfall
of Assad. The Obama Administration has signaled its lack of support
for this option. This, no doubt, is part of a general hesitancy on
Obama's part to take an active role in the regional populist
movements, as well as the possible affects of such a role, on his
2012 re-election prospects. Opponents of such a strategy worry that
it would result in more, not fewer, casualties and enable
post-revolution civil conflict between rival tribes and sects,
similar to the Libyan situation. They also warn that the weapons
could fall into the hands of al Qaida terrorists who support the
insurgency.
A more robust alternative
exists but has few if any supporters. That would be an international
military intervention to train local forces and provide military
operational support. Regional states, even if they supported the
idea, lack the logistics and capabilities to carry out a serious
effort of this type. NATO governments, facing economic stress and
war weary electorates, lack the will to participate. The U.S. has
the ability to carry out such a mission but Obama lacks the will and
leadership skills to convince the American public to support it.
This leaves the so called
“diplomatic solution” along with the usual array of slowly
escalating economic sanctions, as the probable continuing choice.
Economic sanctions, however, are greatly limited without the
participation of all important trading partners and potential
conduits for clandestine trade. Russia, China and Iran fall into
this category. Diplomacy without an incentive to reach an agreement
on the part of all parties simply results in interminable
discussions. Governments are not likely to negotiate themselves out
of existence without the prospect of a similar outcome under far less
desirable circumstances. That is not the case in Syria in spite of
the fact that the elimination of Iran's only Arab ally and patron of
Islamic terrorist groups Hezbollah in Lebanon, and Hamas in Gaza,
would be of significant benefit to regional stability and thus in the
interests of the U.S.
The world, beset by economic
crisis and weak governments, is in a period, perhaps permanent, where
it can no longer rely on U.S. leadership in terms of international
security. The lack of political will, politically mandated diminished
military resources, and the need for international support for
foreign intervention in the post-Iraq/Afghanistan world, have imposed
harsh limits on U.S. capabilities even for humanitarian efforts. A
resurgent isolationism in the U.S. is a derivative of these realities
and is evident in the steady level of support for libertarian
Republican presidential candidate Ron Paul.
The Obama Administration and
any subsequent administration, will have to establish more strict
priorities, based on direct national interests, for the expenditure
of financial, political and military capital in foreign policy
initiatives. Liberals won't like it but the U.S. cannot “free
Tibet”, single handedly create a Palestinian state or bring
democracy or affluence to the world's downtrodden. Conservatives
won't like it but the U.S. cannot keep Russia from intimidating
former Soviet republics on its border or deter China from expanding
its influence in the South China Sea.
Kissinger was right.
No comments:
Post a Comment