In late
October, 2015 a multi-state meeting was held in Vienna which named itself the
International Syria Support Group. The
group was comprised of representatives of seventeen nations and included
officials of the European Union, United Nations
and the Arab League. It was led in substance by U.S. Secretary of
State John Kerry.
The purpose
of the meeting was to build a diplomatic “framework” to bring about an end to
the civil war in Syria which has been raging since 2011 and which has cost the
lives of an estimated 250,000 Syrian citizens and caused the immigration of perhaps
four million others who have fled to neighboring countries and beyond.
The group of
diplomats faced a situation of enormous complexity not the least of which was
the fact that its membership included several nations which have contributed
to, and are playing a role in the conflict itself. Simply put, the “Group” was faced with the
public task of finding common ground while many of the participants were, and
continue to be, primarily motivated by the pursuit of national interests, as
defined by their respective political leaders.
While a
cessation of the conflict is certainly in the interests of the majority of the
international community, the nature of the post-conflict conditions in Syria
offer little consensus despite the officially stated goals that resulted from the meetings. This
lack of genuine consensus puts the agreement at risk of being nothing more than
an unenforceable and unrealistic political statement.
The facts on
the ground explain the complications and risks involved.
International
challenges of this sort require leadership from those with the most
capabilities to influence the outcomes i.e. financial, military, international status. That would strongly imply that an active U.S.
role is vital. However, President Obama
effectively ceded U.S leadership to Russia’s President Vladimir
Putin when he waffled on his 2012 “red
line” ultimatum to Syrian President Bashar al-Assad with regard to Assad’s use
of chemical weapons on his own civilian population. After Obama’s threat, Assad launched rockets
containing sarin nerve gas against the municipality of Ghouta in August of 2013
which resulted in an estimated 1700 civilian death. Obama failed to respond
with the air strikes which he had threatened earlier. This created a credibility problem and
leadership vacuum which emboldened Russia’s President Putin to step in with his
own plan to remove Assad’s chemical weapons, a negotiated process primarily between Putin and Assad in
which Assad agreed to turn over all his chemical weapons.
Obama’s perceived weakness and indecision
would later embolden Putin him to pursue his military intervention in Syria on
behalf of the Assad government. This in
turn has greatly complicated both the military situation on the ground and the
proposed settlement issues. In the meantime, Assad has simply replaced his use
of rocket launched sarin nerve gas with helicopter borne barrel bombs
containing chlorine, a substance left out of the Putin/Assad settlement but a violation of the international Chemical
Weapons Convention. In spite of
his diminished status Obama sent Secretary Kerry to orchestrate the
International Syrian Support Group’s agenda.
The “Final
Declaration” issued by the “Group” after only its second meeting on November 14th
stated that “Syria’s unity, independence, territorial integrity and secular
character are fundamental.” This agenda
was affirmed at a third meeting in New York City on December 18th
which led to a UN Security Council Resolution in its support.
In pursuit
of these declared standards for a post-Assad government, several specific goals
were announced:
1.
UN led negotiations between the current Syrian government and the
“opposition” should be commenced by January 1, 2016 the purpose being to bring
about “a credible, inclusive, non-sectarian government “and a new constitution
and democratic elections.
2.
Not all anti-Assad insurgent groups fighting in Syria would be included
in the negotiations with the Syrian government or any “cease fire”
agreement. The Al Nusra militia which is
the al Qaeda terrorist organization in Syria, and the Islamic State terrorists are
to be excluded. Jordan is tasked with
the job to lead yet to be identified sub-groups to determine which of the many
insurgent groups are “terrorist groups” and which are not. This difficult task was to be accomplished by
January 1, 2016, which has now come and gone.
3. By May 14, 2016, a cease fire
between the Syrian government and accepted opposition groups is supposed come
into force, which will allow the process for drafting a new constitution to
begin.
4.
By May 14, 2017, United Nations administered elections will be held
under the new constitution, bringing in a new government with the hope of
bringing a permanent end to the conflict.
These goals were
the simple part of the process and arrived at after only two meetings. Which nation would publicly state opposition
to such things as a “cease fire” in a bloody civil war, or a regime change
based on a democratic constitution and “free elections”? This of course is the Western liberal
democratic model, satisfying to European and American minds and United Nations
bureaucrats, and presumably to their domestic political constituencies. But the
chasm between such goals and the reality of the actual context of the conflict
is enormous.
Consider
once again the Final Declaration of the Support Group which stated : “Syria’s unity, independence, territorial
integrity and secular character are fundamental.”
Syria’s lack
of“ unity” and “territorial integrity” is currently exposed by the existence of
the Kurdish controlled territory in the northwest border region with
Turkey. The Kurds inhabit contiguous
regions in Turkey, Iran and Iraq and have long demanded, and fought for an
independent Kurdistan in those regions. They have “autonomous” status in
adjoining Iraq and as the most organized and effective fighting force currently
in Syria, they are not likely to negotiate away their status or goals as part
of a broader settlement.
Then of
course, there is the Islamic State which controls significant territory in
Syria and has established its “capital” in the Syrian city of Raqqa. President Obama has stated that the struggle
against the Islamic State will take years.
His current “strategy” of small numbers of “Special Operations advisers”
and numerous tactical air strikes which are burdened by highly restrictive
rules of engagement, has shown little progress to make even this long range
prediction believable but time table of the International Syria Support Group
extends only until 2017.
Syria’s
“independence” is currently not a reality.
Besides the presence of the Islamic State, Russia, Iran and Lebanese Shi’ite militia Hezbollah all have a significant presence in pursuit of their
own interests. Russian and Iran are both
members of the International Syria Support Group and can be expected to wield
much influence in the outcome of any negotiations for Syria’s future.
Can a future
Syrian government reasonably be expected to have a “secular” “democratic” character?
This Western
concept would have to be enshrined in the new constitution by the parties to
the negotiations, under the influence of the Support Group. Outside of the Kurdish forces and their
allies in the eastern and northeaster regions of Syria there are few
significant insurgent groups which could be characterized as “secular”,
“moderate” or inclined towards the democratic model in a post-Assad Syria but
there are scores of militant Islamist groups.
The Islamic
Front which is considered the most formidable opposition force is a loose
coalition of seven Islamist groups. The most powerful of these being Ahrār ash-Shām which is considered by some to be a terrorist
group. Together these seven groups are estimated to have as many as 70,000
fighters.
The goal of the Islamic Front and its
component brigades is to establish a Salafist style fundamentalist Islamic
state in Syria, governed by Sharia law. They
differ from the formally declared Islamic State (ISIS) only by their lack of
international ambitions. The charter of
the Islamic Front specifically rejects the concepts of representative democracy
and secularism.
But the composition of the “Support
Group” itself poses an obvious and contradictory expectation of support for a
“secular” and “democratic” constitution.
Members include Egypt, Jordan, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Iran and the
United Arab Emirates, none of which are constitutional democracies and unlikely
to want to see a democratic movement in the region. Saudi Arabia, and Iran are Islamist
theocracies as well , and Saudi Arabia is a supporter of the fundamentalist
Islamic Front and is pushing for it to be included in the negotiations for a
post-Assad regime.
The Support Group also includes representatives
from the Arab League, a twenty-two nation regional organization which contains
an even wider array of non-democratic states with Islamist parties, movements
or sectarian governments.
The process is also at risk by the recent
escalation of long-term hostilities between Group members Saudi Arabia and Iran
over the Saudi execution of a Shi’ite radical mullah who was supported by
Iran. While direct military
confrontations between the two Islamist governments are unlikely, a continuation
and perhaps expansion of proxy wars as is currently underway in Yemen, can be
expected to be a sub-plot to the resolution of the Syrian conflict.
Thus significant forces within and
outside of Syria are not compatible with the idealistic Western orientation of
the official goals of the International Syria Support Group and the likelihood
of such an outcome is remote.
Other issues which haven’t been addressed
by the Support Group loom above the process.
The
multiple opposition forces do not speak with one voice. They are organized around different, often
competing regional, religious and individual ambitions of their leaders. The
Support Group requires negotiations between selected insurgent group leaders and
the Syrian government but the Syrian government “is” Assad, who the U.S. and
others want to be removed as a pre-condition to negotiation, while the Russians
want Assad to remain during negotiations and transition. The Iranians want Assad to remain permanently
as he represents a Shi’ite client state.
Either way, who will be the government
negotiators? Assad will likely not
negotiate his own downfall. He has
killed a quarter of a million of his own citizens. He will almost certainly be indicted by the
International Criminal Court should he resign.
His military leaders are complicit in the atrocities and would likely
face similar indictments.
The prospects for a smooth, negotiated
transition to any type of government are remote because there is a strong
probability that once Assad is removed, his military will collapse as its
senior Alawite officers and rank and file flee to avoid retribution by the
Sunni rebels. The resulting power vacuum
will result in renewed conflict as the competing rebel factions seek power.
If Assad
is removed and his government and military collapse, who will fight the Islamic
State?
Negotiations
are to include a ceasefire but not with the Islamic State, Al Qaeda or other
yet to be named “terrorist groups”. Is a
partial ceasefire based on some participants and some geographical areas but
not others a “cease fire” at all?
Any ensuing and prolonged
chaos will offer new opportunities for the Islamic State to expand its geographical
control. The only possible positive
scenario of a post-Assad era is for the negotiated removal of Assad to include
a consolidation of rebel forces into an anti-Islamic State force to achieve the
stated goal of “territorial integrity”. Concessions
would have to be made to the Kurds. These could be the anti-Islamic State
ground troops which no one else in the region or in the West wants to
deploy. But they would need regional and
Western support and the Syrian conflict would continue.
In essence, the framework
of the International Syria Support Group is a set of goals without a strategy
or even a national or regional consensus among the operative groups and nations
most involved.
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